This paper analyzes portfolio allocation decisions of individual investors. Our dataset records how individuals allocate their money among risky funds and a money-market fund, and also the characteristics of both the investors and the financial advisors who sell the products. These data offer a unique opportunity to investigate how portfolio decisions are affected by financial advisors. Our empirical strategy consists in studying the relationship between the share of the total capital invested in risky funds and the characteristics of buyers and sellers. Since the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one, we estimate a fractional response model. We find that the share invested in risky funds is larger when the advisor is more educated. Furthermore, male advisors sell larger shares of risky funds than female advisors. We offer possible explanations for these findings.
Introduction
In most developed countries an increasing fraction of households participate in stock markets (Curcuru et al., 2009, and Guiso et al., 2003) . One explanation for this trend is that publicly provided pension schemes are becoming less generous. People anticipate that their future incomes may be reduced and try to compensate for this loss by purchasing stocks. Another explanation is the growth of the mutual funds industry (Rydqvist, Spizman and Strebulaev, 2011 ) which simplifies the access to financial markets and lowers transaction costs.
The increased participation in stock markets comes with more responsibilities given to households who have to decide how to invest and diversify their wealth. Given the high risk premium earned by stockholders in the long term, the problem of allocating wealth between risky and safe assets is crucial for consumers' future standard of living. It is potentially also one of the most complex financial decisions they must make. The allocation problem requires, at least in theory, a deep knowledge about the functioning of financial markets. Investors must also confront themselves with the question of how much risk they are ready to take, which requires a good apprehension of their own risk tolerance in a complex stochastic environment.
Faced with such a difficult task, it is not surprising that people seek professional advice.
They consult independent financial advisors or ask advice from counselors who work in banks or insurance retail branches. The demand for financial experts is widespread. Allen (2001) reports that more than 60 percent of individual investors in the U.S. rely on professional investment advice. In the Netherlands this figure is around 50 percent and in Germany around 80 percent (Kramer and Lensink, 2009 ). Financial experts also exert a potentially strong influence on households' investment decisions. Gerhardt and Hackethal (2009) Given these facts it is important to apprehend the precise role played by financial advisors and the quality of their advice.
The empirical literature on the effect of financial advisors is nonetheless still small. 1 Most papers in this field have examined the influence of experts on the performance and composition Kramer and Lensink (2009) study equity investors of a Dutch bank, and also find that advisors negatively affect average portfolio returns. The portfolios of advised clients are, however, better diversified and have lower variability in returns. Gerhardt and Hackethal (2009) analyze a data set of detailed portfolio compositions and daily transactions of customers of a German direct bank. They report that advised customers hold less equities and trade more than non-advised customers. The portfolio returns of advised clients are, unlike the previous studies, slightly higher than those of non-advised clients.
There are also some papers on the individual determinants for seeking financial advice, and the influence of advice on the suitability of investors' portfolio allocations with their risk profiles. Bluethgen et al. (2008) use administrative data from a German retail bank and find that clients who seek professional advice are older, wealthier, more risk averse, and more likely to be female.
Jansen et al. (2008) have survey data on the self-reported degree of risk aversion of customers
(also of a German retail bank), and some advisor characteristics (gender, number of customers advised in past year, years of experience in securities advice). In addition they have comprehensive demographic information on the customers and their accounts. Regressing the equity share on the advisor-attributes (and customer demographics), they find that customers invest less in equities when they consult more experienced advisors. The advisor's gender and the number of clients advised do not, however, significantly affect the share of capital invested in equities.
Jansen et al. furthermore report that advisors tend to incite customers to overinvest in equities relatively to what their risk profiles would call for. Berg et al. (2010) collect data from financial advisors and bank customers and investigate the decision process underlying portfolio choices.
They show that most customers deliberately use a limited set of information.
Our paper contributes to this literature. Using a large administrative data set from a French financial company, we study how individual portfolio decisions are influenced by financial advisors. The data set records information about the investment accounts opened by individuals between January 2004 and December 2005 through the company's network of agencies. We observe the total amount of money invested by customers when they open an account, and how it is allocated among several risky funds and a money-market fund. By risky fund, we mean one of the eight "unit-linked" funds preselected by the company, and which are mostly composed of equities (see next section for more details about the funds). The money-market fund is composed of short-term debt and offers a close-to-riskless rate of return. We also observe information about the customers (their age and gender), and the financial advisors who sell the financial products (their age, sex, education, previous work experience, job tenure, family situation, parental status, and the region where the agency is located). Our empirical strategy consists in analyzing the relationship between the share of the total capital invested in risky funds and the characteristics of both customers and sellers. The share invested in risky funds is a good and simple measure of the riskiness of a portfolio allocation, and has frequently been taken as the dependent variable in the literature on individual portfolio behavior (see for instance Agnew et al., 2003, and Papke, 1998) . Since the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one, we estimate a fractional response model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . In a first-best environment with well-informed and optimizing investors, asset allocation decisions should only depend on customer characteristics (their age, wealth, and variables that reflect attitudes towards risk). The characteristics of sellers such as their gender, age, or work experience, should not matter from the investor's point of view. As a result, such variables should not be statistically significant in our regressions. A significant impact of sellers' characteristics would instead reveal some frictions in the decision-making process that have to be elucidated.
Although the data set records many seller characteristics, the empirical analysis mainly focuses on the role of two variables: the advisor's education level and gender. Our results show that the level of education has a statistically significant and positive effect on the share of capital invested in equities: highly educated financial advisors sell more risky mutual funds to their clients than lowly educated advisors. This finding is interesting in light of an empirical literature documenting a strong relationship between participation rates in equity markets for the population at large, and their education level and financial literacy. Rooij et al. (2011) document that financial literacy is a strong predictor of stock market participation. Guiso et al. (2003) show that education has a positive and significant effect on equity ownership in a series of European countries, even after controlling for differences in age, income and wealth among investors. Campbell (2006) finds a similar result with data from the U.S. We find that the predictive power of financial literacy and education that is found for individual investors holds for financial advisors as well. A possible interpretation of this finding is that less educated sellers may be incompletely and imperfectly informed about financial markets. These advisors may feel less at ease with relatively complicated financial products such as stocks or fixed-income securities, and therefore less inclined to recommend risky funds to their clients. are observed more than once (on average they sign contracts with about twenty clients). The inclusion of seller-specific effects allows to control for endogenous matching. It turns out that the estimation of the extended model does not alter our main findings.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, Section 3 presents the estimation methods and empirical results, and Section 4 concludes.
Data
Our data come from a large French financial company operating in the markets of insurance, When investors purchase the product we are studying, they first have to decide how much money they wish to invest, and then how to allocate the total amount into different types of funds. Investors must split the total invested amount between a money-market fund, or eurobased fund (fonds euro in French), and eight preselected unit-linked funds (fonds en unité de compte), which are mostly equity funds. The capital invested in the euro-based fund is very close to being riskless as the return on investment is linked to the rate of return of the money market with a minimum return guaranteed by the company. The first line of Table 1 This illustrates the high level of risk taken by investors when they invest in unit-linked funds rather than in the euro-based fund.
After the initial purchase date of the contract, investors may at any time invest supplementary amounts of money. These subsequent investments may again be made in both the euro-based and the unit-linked funds. The accumulated capital (invested sums of money plus the returns to investments) can be partly or completely withdrawn at any time.
The company markets the life insurance product through different channels. In our database we observe the contracts that were purchased by clients through the company's network of agencies. The agencies are located throughout France. Each agency is directed by one or several agents (agents généraux). These agents are not directly employed by the company. Instead, they act as independent managers who are mandated to sell the company's whole range of insurance and financial products. They earn commissions from the sale of company's products.
Commissions vary with the type of product and premium size. In the case of life insurance products, they keep a fraction of the front loads, which are fees proportional to savers' payments, and level loads that are charged as a percentage of the total amount invested each year. Some of the managers are assisted by a few employees. The managers are, however, in principle the ones who counsel and negotiate with the clients visiting the agency. They provide them with information about the product, and give portfolio allocation advice.
Our database is a contract-based data set. It records all contracts signed between January 2004 and December 2005. We exclude from the initial sample the contracts concluded in agencies that are directed by more than one manager. Although we know in these cases the characteristics of each manager, we cannot tell which manager contracted with a given client. Also excluded from the initial sample are the contracts with missing observations on characteristics of clients or managers. The final sample consists of 24,375 contracts. These contracts were sold in 1,215 different agencies (and hence by 1,215 different managers). For each contract, the data set records the characteristics of the client, the characteristics of the manager who sold the contract, the district where the agency is located (France is made up of 98 administrative districts), the date at which the contract was sold, and the contract parameters. Table 2 shows summary statistics on the characteristics of the clients and managers. For both clients and managers we observe their age and gender. For managers we observe some additional characteristics: their education, job-tenure, work experience before their current job, their family situation, and whether the managers have children that are still financially dependent on them.
All characteristics are measured at the date of contract signature. Clients are on average 49 years old, and about half of them are men (52%). Managers are on average younger (just under 45) and they are primarily male (93%). There is much variation in the education level of managers. A few of them (almost 1%) declared they had not followed any formal education at all beyond primary school (autodidact). 5% just had a basic vocational training (comparable to the level-1 National Vocational Qualification in the U.K. system), and 5%
only earned a general certificate of secondary education (the first diploma pupils can obtain after 4 years of high school). 22% of managers declared to have a high school diploma. The remaining managers studied beyond high school: 33% had two years of higher education, 14% between two and four years of higher education, and 20% more than four years of higher education. On average the tenure of the current job was almost 8.5 years. 56% of the managers stated they had previous work experience in insurance, sales (79%), and administration (76%). The large majority of managers were married (73%), but there were also singles (13%), managers who were separated, divorced or widow(er)s (4%), and managers who were engaged or cohabited with someone else (10%). The contract parameters we observe are the total capital invested at the enrollment date, and the allocation of this amount among the money-market fund and the unit-linked funds. We do not observe how much money is invested in each of the eight unit-linked funds separately, but just the total amount invested in the unit-linked funds. 4 We do not observe either possible investments made after the opening of the life insurance account. The decisions made at the opening date are, however, the most interesting ones for the purpose of this study since we are sure that at this moment the client and manager actually met each other. In contrast, later investment decisions can be made via Internet or mail, i.e., without any interaction between the client and manager. Table 4 gives summary statistics on the total capital invested per contract, and the corresponding amounts invested in the money-market fund and unit-linked funds. 4 As an example, one client in the sample invested a total capital equal to 15,000 e, of which 6,000 e was invested in the euro-based fund, and 9,000 e in the unit-linked funds. On average the total capital invested per client equals 9,430 e. The smallest total amount invested by a client equals 120 e and the largest 900,000 e. The average amount invested per client in the money-market fund (resp. unit-linked funds) equals 7,842 e (resp. 1,588 e). The average client clearly invested much more in the riskless assets than in the risky ones. 5 This is confirmed by the summary statistics on the share of the total capital invested in the unit-linked funds, reported in Table 5 (line indicating full sample). Clients invested on average 19% of the total capital in risky funds at the opening of their investment account. Since the 50th percentile is zero, more than 50% of the clients did not invest at all in the unit-linked funds (more precisely, 58% did not). At the other extreme, more than 5% of the clients invested all their capital in these funds. remaining 5% are continuously distributed between 0 and 1. The estimation method presented in the next section acknowledges this feature of the data.
Insert Fig. 3 around here
As explained in the introduction, we primarily focus on the role played by manager gender and manager education. We wish to allow for the possibility that manager gender has different effects on the risky share according to whether the client is male or female. In the empirical analysis we therefore interact the indicator of manager gender with the indicator of client gender. We also slightly redefine the education variable. Instead of distinguishing the initial seven education levels, we define a new binary education variable that indicates whether a manager is highly educated (if the initial education variable falls in one of the three highest categories) or lowly educated (if it falls in one of the four lowest categories). Table 5 reports summary statistics on the share invested in risky funds by education level, and by gender-client/gender-manager combination. On average, lowly educated managers sell a share of 0.184, whereas highly educated managers sell 0.200. The hypothesis that the share has the same mean within the two subgroups is rejected at the 1% level. When both the client and manager are female, the lowest share in risky funds is generated (the average share in this case is 0.151), and the highest share is generated when both are male (0.218). The two other combinations, i.e., when client and manager are not of the same gender, generate intermediate levels (both means equal 0.174). We can again reject at the 1% level the hypothesis of equal means within each possible pair of subgroups (except when we contrast the combinations client female × manager male and client male × manager female). This means in particular that female managers sell significantly lower risky shares than male managers, regardless of the client's gender. Since the difference in means between the first two interaction variables is smaller than for the last two, the impact of manager gender is stronger for male clients than for female clients.
Before turning to the next section, we wish to comment on the advantages and drawbacks of our data. A clear advantage is that the data are administrative. Compared to data sets where information on investment decisions come from surveys, our data are probably less subject to measurement errors. Another, and for this paper crucial, advantage of our data is that they include information about the characteristics of the financial advisors who advised the clients in their portfolio decisions. Compared to the database used by Jansen et al. (2008) (the only other paper we are aware of that has information on advisor characteristics), we have more detailed information on sellers. There are also some important disadvantages. One is that we know relatively little about the clients. Another drawback is that we do not have information about the subsequent returns on the assets chosen by the customers at the opening of their accounts (as in some of the studies cited in the introduction). Because of this, we cannot for instance study whether clients who were advised by a female seller had lower or higher returns on their (more prudent) investments. Yet another drawback is that we do not know anything about the trading activities of the investors following the opening of their accounts. Therefore we cannot assess the effect of managers' characteristics on later portfolio reshuffling. Finally, we have no access to other investment or saving accounts that clients possibly hold.
Methods and results
In this section we first present the econometric model that we use to estimate the link between the share invested in risky funds on the one hand and the characteristics of clients and sellers on the other hand. Then we present and discuss the main empirical results. Finally we present some additional estimations to check for the robustness of our conclusions.
Econometric model
Our dependent variable is the share of the total capital invested in the unit-linked funds. Let s ijt be the random variable representing the share purchased by client i in period t, when this client negotiated and contracted with manager j. This variable is a fraction and is therefore necessarily between 0 and 1. If it is relatively small (resp. large) the client's choice is relatively riskless (resp. risky). From Figure 2 we know that the dependent variable is partly discrete and partly continuous. To account for this discrete/continuous nature of s ijt , one possibility would be to estimate the doubly-censored model used by Agnew et al. (2003) . However this model would not be fully appropriate in our case as it implicitly assumes that the dependent variable is continuously distributed between the two censoring points (zero and one). This is clearly not the case in our data since the distribution of s ijt also has a lot of mass at the deciles 0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9. Another possibility is to define the distribution of s ijt as a mixture of a discrete and a continuous distribution and then estimate the parameters of the model by maximum likelihood.
The drawback of this approach is first that the resulting likelihood is rather complicated, and second that the results are likely to be very sensitive to distributional assumptions.
A simpler method to take into account the features of our dependent variable is to use the estimation method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . The method does not require that the distribution of the dependent variable is fully specified. It is only necessary to correctly specify the mean conditionally on the explanatory variables. The unknown parameters in the conditional mean are estimated by maximizing a quasi-likelihood function. To be more precise, let
x ijt be the vector of explanatory variables, and assume that the share invested in the unit-linked funds can be written as s ijt = G(x ijt β) ijt , where β is a vector of parameters of interest, G(·) a cumulative distribution function, and ijt an error term capturing all characteristics of clients and managers not included in the vector of explanatory variables. We assume in addition that the error term is independent of the explanatory variables and has mean one, i.e., E( ijt |x ijt ) = 1.
This implies that the conditional mean of s ijt conditional on x ijt is
The assumption that G(·) is a distribution function guarantees that the predicted values of s ijt are between 0 and 1 for all values of the explanatory variables and parameters. The dependent variable s ijt may be continuous, discrete, or mixed continuous/discrete (as in our specific case).
Papke and Wooldridge propose to estimate the parameter vector β by maximizing a Bernoulli log-likelihood function. The contribution of an observation to the log-likelihood is
The quasi-maximum likelihood estimator of β is defined as the maximum of the quasi-likelihood function:
The estimator converges to the true parameter vector β if the conditional mean of s ijt is correctly specified, i.e., if it is indeed given by (1) . A powerful result is that since (2) The asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of the estimator can be estimated by (see Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) :
and g(z) = dG(z)/dz,Ĝ ijt = G(x ijtβ ),β is the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator,ĝ ijt = g(x ijtβ ), andû ijt = s ijt −G(x ijtβ ) is the residual (difference between observed share and estimated conditional expectation). Table 6 gives the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation results of the parameter vector β appearing in the mean (1) for the case where G(·) is the logistic cumulative distribution function, i.e., G(z) = exp(z)/[1 + exp(z)]. We report the results for several specifications of the vector of explanatory variables x ijt . Column 1 presents the results for the simplest specification: the vector contains only a constant, the age of client i, and our four primary variables of interest: the three interactions between the gender of client i and gender of manager j (we omit the category client-female × manager-female as the reference variable) and the dummy indicating whether manager j is highly educated or not.
Empirical results
As column 1 indicates, the client's age is strongly significant and has a negative sign: older clients appear to invest less in risky assets than younger clients. This is in line with the results obtained in the literature on individual portfolio choices in large U.S. pension plans (see for example Papke, 1998, and Agnew et al. 2003) . Since the variable client-female × manager-male has a positive and significant effect, female clients invest more in risky assets when they contract with male sellers than with female sellers. Similarly, since client-male × manager-male has a larger effect than client-male × manager-female and the two variables are significantly different from each other (at the 1% level), male clients choose riskier asset portfolios when they contract with male sellers than with female sellers. In line with our earlier results (see Table 3 ), we thus find that male managers sell more risky portfolio allocations than female managers, and, since 0.424-0.152=0.272>0.171, this influence of manager gender is more substantial for male clients than for female clients. However, unlike our earlier findings, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that this difference equals zero (the test-statistic of the Wald test equals 1.119, while the 5% critical value of the chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom is 3.84). 7 The education dummy is positive and significantly different from zero, indicating that highly educated managers sell more risky funds than lowly educated managers. This is also in line with the results reported in Table 5 . Table 6 : QML estimation of model (1) (G is the logistic cdf) In the specification of column 2 the other manager characteristics listed in Table 6 are included in the vector x ijt as well. We also include the average total invested capital, where the average is calculated over all clients of manager j (during the observation period, i.e., between January 2004 and December 2005) except the i-th. This variable is intended to capture the wealth of client i. The implicit assumption made here is therefore that other clients contracting with manager j make similar investments as client i, and total capital invested is a good proxy for a person's Agnew et al. 2003) . Column 1 implies, however, that this well documented gender effect only holds when the seller is male (men purchase significantly more risky funds than women when they deal with a male seller, but purchase similar stock levels when they deal with a female seller).
wealth.
8 For ease of exposition we do not report the estimated coefficients associated with these variables (the table just indicates that the specification corresponding to column 2 includes the additional controls). As column 2 shows, the results regarding our four primary variables of interest remain unchanged. All conclusions that were drawn on the basis of the first column remain exactly the same.
The specification of column 3 adds twenty three month indicators (the observation period has twenty four months from which we omit the reference month January 2004). Focussing on our primary variables of interest, we see that the results remain unchanged except that the dummy for higher education is no longer significant at the 1% level, but at the 5% level only (pvalue is 0.011). Finally, the specification of column 4 adds ninety five district indicators (France is made up of ninety eight administrative districts from which we have omitted the reference district 75, the city of Paris, and the districts 96 and 97, in which there are no agencies). The results regarding our main variables remain again unchanged except that the dummy for higher education is now significant at the 10% only (p-value is 0.06). Table 6 also contains an R 2 for each specification. The measure of goodness-of-fit we use is the one proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) , and is defined as
ijt . As the table shows, the R 2 augments from 0.331 (column 1) to 0.393 (column 4).
To summarize, we find that, even after controlling for a large set of variables (client's age, a proxy for clients' wealth, seller characteristics, time and district dummies), the gender of the seller matters in portfolio choices of individual investors: for both male and female clients, the risky share is higher when the manager is male. Furthermore, more educated managers sell higher shares of risky funds than less educated managers. In the next subsection we present some additional estimations to check for the robustness of these conclusions.
Robustness checks
The estimates reported in the previous subsection may be misleading if managers do not contract with all the clients that come to their agencies. It may be that some managers primarily contract with the "big" clients (i.e., those investing large amounts of money at the enrollment date), and let their assistants deal with the "small" clients. If this is indeed the case, the manager characteristics included in the model may be measured with error (in the subsample of small contracts), implying that the estimates reported so far are biased and have no causal interpretation. To check for this possibility, we have re-estimated model (1) on different subsamples, first excluding all contracts for which the total invested capital is smaller than 1,000 e, then all contracts smaller than 2,000 e, then all contracts smaller than 3,000 e, ..., until all contracts smaller than 30,000 e (which amounts to eliminating 91% of the initial sample). 9 As more and more observations are dropped, the coefficients on the three interaction variables tend to increase slightly. The first and third interaction variable remain significant for practically all subsamples (as in column 1 of Table   6 ). The second interaction variable becomes significant once we reach the selection threshold of 7,000 e (and remains significant for all other subsequent subsamples). The coefficient on the education variable stays relatively constant. It remains significant (as in column 1) until the threshold of 5,000 e is reached, and is insignificant for practically all subsequent subsamples.
The results of the previous subsection thus appear relatively robust to dropping the contracts purchased by small investors.
The estimates reported in the previous subsection may also be misleading if there are unobserved characteristics of advisors and clients (captured by ijt ) that are determinants of risky shares and correlated with the observed explanatory variables x ijt . Since our data set reveals little information about clients, it is possible that there are unobserved and important client characteristics that are correlated with observed regressors. If these unobserved client characteristics are related to observed advisor variables then we have a problem of endogenous matching of managers and clients. It could for example be the case that female sellers attract less rich buyers. 10 Since client wealth is an unobserved variable 11 that affects portfolio decisions of households (richer people invest more in risky funds, see for example Agnew et al., 2003) , this may generate a problem of endogenous matching. As a consequence, the coefficients associated with our three gender-interaction terms would partly pick up the fact that female managers deal with clients that are inherently less interested in risky funds. A bias resulting from endogenous matching may similarly arise when less educated sellers attract less educated investors. Endogenous matching is potentially a problem as financial advisors have various easily detectable traits that may be important for clients in choosing their appropriate agency. In addition, the first and last name of 9 Since these subsequent selections drastically reduce the sample size, we have estimated the specification with the fewest parameters, i.e., the one corresponding to column 1 in Table 6 . To check this we present in Table 7 regressions of three manager characteristics (gender, age, and education) on various client characteristics : age, gender, the total capital invested, age crossed with gender, and total invested capital crossed with gender. What emerges from these regressions is that only few variables of clients and managers appear to be correlated. In the model where manager gender is the dependent variable, no client variable has a statistically significant effect.
In the model with manager age as the dependent variable, only client's age has a significant effect. Its coefficient is positive indicating that older clients tend to match with older managers.
Finally, in the model with manager education as the left hand side variable, only total capital invested by the client has a significant impact. The coefficient is positive implying that clients who bring in more capital tend to negotiate with more highly educated managers. So overall these results do not give the impression that endogenous matching is overwhelmingly present. The R 2 is the usual one defined in OLS regression.
The fact that the observable characteristics of both types of agents are not correlated does not exclude the possibility that unobserved clients variables are linked to manager variables. To address the unobserved-variables problem (and the problem of endogenous matching in particular) one would ideally specify the expectation of ijt given x ijt as a function of a client specific effect, a manager-specific effect, and a client/manager-specific effect. Since each client is only observed once in our data set (i.e., we do not observe multiple investment decisions for a given client), we cannot identify the client-specific and client/manager-specific terms (identification of the latter requires in addition that clients contract with different managers). Since managers have typically transacted with different clients the managers-specific terms are, however, identified. Formally, we specify E( ijt |x ijt ) = δ j . Note that this specification does not exclude the possibility that there are unobserved client variables in the error term ijt . It only assumes that the conditional expectation of these unobserved variables does not vary with client i (but only with manager j). The conditional mean (1) becomes E(s ijt |x ijt ) = G(x ijt β)δ j . We can redefine
, where µ j can be seen as the seller-specific fixed effect. Once the fixed effects are included, we can no longer identify manager variables that remain fixed during the observation period (such as the education variable). One additional gender-interaction dummy is also no longer identifiable (we omitted the dummy "client female × manager male"). To estimate the extended model including the fixed effects, we have to drop the observations corresponding to managers who sold just one contract, and the observations corresponding to managers j for whom either s ijt = 0 or s ijt = 1, for all i and t (by inspecting the log-likelihood (2) it is easy to see that for such managers the individual effects are not identified). Estimation of the extended model consists in maximizing the quasi-likelihood function with respect to approximately thousand parameters (coefficients associated with the identified variables plus a fixed effect µ j for each seller j).
The fixed-effects estimates of the primary coefficients of interest together with their standard errors are: -1.664 (0.085) ("age client"), 0.136 (0.094) ("client male × manager female"), and 0.266 (0.024) ("client male × manager male"). For comparison, we have also re-estimated model (1) without fixed effects using exactly the same reduced sample as in the fixed-effects estimation.
The specification is the one corresponding to column 4. The estimates of the three coefficients and the corresponding standard errors are now: -1.490 (0.079), 0.135 (0.092), and 0.390 (0.074).
The two models produce comparable results: the coefficients are of similar magnitude and the variables that are significant in the model without fixed effects remain so in the model with fixed effects. Furthermore, both models allow us to reject (at the 1% level) the hypothesis that the two interaction dummies are equal (implying that male clients purchase a larger fraction of risky funds when they negotiate with male sellers than with female sellers). The results with fixed effects are thus comparable to those of the previous subsection, so endogenous matching does
Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of financial advisors on investment decisions. We use administrative data from a financial company on portfolio allocation decisions, and the characteristics of both investors and advisors who sold the contracts. A central message is that advisors' characteristics play an important role in portfolio choices of individual investors. We find that advisors with high levels of education sell riskier portfolio allocations (portfolios with larger shares of risky mutual funds) than advisors with low levels of education. The latter are possibly less informed about the precise functioning of stock markets, and may as a result recommend portfolios with less risky funds to their clients. Our second main finding is that female advisors sell less risky funds than male advisors. Our interpretation is that individual investors are affected by the degree of risk aversion of sellers.
A more general interpretation of our results is that investors do not have firm preferences over how much to invest in risky assets due to the high complexity of the decision problem. As a consequence, they are prone to follow outside advice and to be influenced by financial experts in a way that may reflect their preferences but also advisers' characteristics. As such, our results echo previous studies which show that personal portfolio decisions are influenced by peers such as co-workers (Duflo and Saez, 2002) , neighbors (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004) or spouses (Lyons, Neelakantan, and Scherpf, 2008), even though no attempt is made in these articles to relate peers' characteristics to investment decisions.
The content of our article is mainly positive. We point out that savers' decisions are affected by the profiles of financial experts from whom they seek advice. Our results do not allow us to judge whether advisors have a detrimental influence on savers' choices or not. It may be that experts' recommendations lead to portfolio decisions that somehow better reflect underlying preferences of customers (one paper cited in the introduction finds, however, the contrary).
Financial advice may also augment portfolio returns (but again this seems contradicted by the small literature discussed in the introduction). Investors' behavioral biases such as overtrading or underinvestment may also be attenuated by professionals. More empirical work should be devoted in the future to these fundamental issues. 
